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While much research has explored the role of imitation in children’s learning of 
instrumental skills (Call et al., 2005; Carpenter et al., 2002; Gleissner et al., 2000; Lyons 
et al., 2007; Whiten et al., 2009), very little is known about the link between imitation 
and the acquisition of cultural conventional behavior. New research suggests that children 
rely on a variety of social and contextual cues when determining when to imitate with 
high or low fidelity and that these cues may reflect children’s interpretation of a task as 
either instrumental or conventional (Herrmann et al., 2013). Previous work examining 
children’s imitation has primarily used either unfamiliar, causally opaque object 
manipulation tasks (Herrmann et al., 2013) or complex instrumental tasks that make use 
of materials used in novel ways (Lyons et al., 2007; Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011), but 
research has yet to explore children’s imitation when presented with a causally accessible 
and familiar instrumental task. Drawing from an oft-observed classroom craft, the present 
study examined children’s reasoning about a necklace-making task when they were 
presented with either a conventional or an instrumental framing for the task and the 
cognitive consequences of this reasoning.   
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The Art of Convention: 
Cognitive Foundations of Cultural Learning 
Adi, a young girl in Chiapas, Mexico, watches her mother make tortillas and then 
practices in the main room of the family home with a piece of plastic, mimicking the way 
her mother moved the tortilla around on her knee (Gaskins and Paradise, 2010). Marcos, 
a five-year-old Quechan boy, practices starting a fire the way he has seen his parents and 
siblings do it, using two stones to spark a flame (Bolin, 2006). Scenes like these are 
ubiquitous in early childrearing settings around the world (Lancy, Bock, & Gaskins, 
2010; Lancy, 2008), and according to the archeological record have been across historical 
time (Crown, 2010).  As cultural novices, children observe the adult behaviors they are 
privy to and use what they learn from their observations of adult practices to shape their 
behavior (Lancy, 2008; Rogoff, 2003). In each of the examples provided above, children 
are engaging in imitation to learn an instrumental skill and copying the actions of adults 
and older peers as they attempt to become active participants in their respective cultures. 
Imitation facilitates high fidelity transmission of information and is an efficient 
tool for cultural learning (Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Harris, 2012; Tennie, Call & 
Tomasello, 2009; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll, 2005; Whiten, McGuigan, 
Marshall-Pescini & Hopper, 2009). Despite the fact that children have access to a 
plethora of opportunities to learn through imitation, children are not indiscriminate 
imitators. Instead I propose that children are selective about when they imitate and to 
what degree. In order to be effective and efficient learners, children must be able to 
discriminate between when they need to learn “the way things are done, [as opposed to] 
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what gets done” (Nielsen, 2010, p. 735). There has been a call within comparative and 
developmental psychology to determine the specific conditions that lead children to 
engage in high fidelity imitation and those in which they choose to introduce variation 
(Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010; Over & Carpenter, 2012; Whiten, et. al, 2009). Nonetheless, 
little is known about why children imitate some actions with higher fidelity than others or 
how children navigate the different functions of imitation when approaching new 
opportunities for learning. 
 Legare and colleagues (Legare, et al., under review) argue that children 
discriminate between cultural conventions and instrumental skill learning through the 
differential activation of what they term the ritual stance and the instrumental stance. 
The activation of each stance results in engagement in a distinct behavioral profile. The 
ritual stance is based on the inference that rituals (i.e., conventional, causally opaque 
procedures) are not grounded in observable physical-causal rationales.  Thus, attempts to 
understand the physical-causal reasoning behind the behaviors is not of interest; instead, 
the behaviors themselves and the way they are executed become the focal point of 
learning and subsequent imitation. As a result, children engage in high fidelity imitation 
and display low levels of innovation, introducing little variability into their own 
replication of the behavior. 
In contrast, the instrumental stance is based on the inference that a behavior has a 
clearly intended outcome or end-goal. Even if the physical-causal structure behind this 
outcome is not readily apparent, children are poised to quickly process connections 
between actions and their outcomes. Because of this, children will seek to replicate the 
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end goal, engaging in innovation when possible and eliminating causally irrelevant 
actions. If the inference is made that the physical-causal structure of an action sequence is 
potentially knowable, they will act upon this assumption to engage in efficient replication 
of the end goal rather than an exact replication of the process.  
 The distinction between the ritual and instrumental stances is not based on the 
assumption that acts or behaviors are strictly or inherently conventional or instrumental, 
but instead assumes that the learner makes inferences about a behavior (which could 
contain both conventional and instrumental elements) based on the social and contextual 
cues present. For example, a child observing the preparation of bread in their home could 
be witnessing a process simply meant for the production of a food item for their 
household or a ritualistic undertaking meant to celebrate a coming holiday (e.g., a 
Bulgarian tradition of preparing a special bread for Easter).  In this situation, the child 
must determine whether they should work toward the efficient preparation of bread, 
eliminating elements that may not be necessary in achieving the final end goal, or 
whether they should attempt an exact replication of the process. In order to determine 
which stance to take, the child might attend to a variety of cues, and recent work provides 
evidence that these cues include start/end state differences, the language used to describe 
the process (Legare, et al., under review; Watson-Jones, Legare, Whitehouse, & Clegg, 
under review), as well as consensus and synchrony among actors (Herrmann, Legare, 
Harris, & Whitehouse, under review).   
 The present study sought to further explore children’s use of social cues, 
specifically language cues, when approaching a novel demonstration of a task. Rather 
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than using the cues in combination with various start- and end-state or actor conditions as 
examined in previous research investigating the ritual and instrumental stances, this study 
provided children with a familiar cultural craft (necklace-making) and used language to 
prompt a ritual versus an instrumental interpretation of the task. 
 Previous work examining the activation of the ritual and instrumental stances has 
focused primarily on the imitation of unfamiliar, causally opaque object manipulation 
tasks. These action sequences are intended to approximate the arbitrary nature of most 
cultural rituals in which objects are used for functions that might not reflect their direct 
causal properties. In order to better understand the cognitive mechanisms surrounding the 
instrumental and ritual stances and their applicability to day-to-day learning, the present 
study examined the application of the stances to an ecologically valid and causally 
accessible task. An additional objective of this study was to explore the cognitive 
processes underlying the activation of the ritual and instrumental stance and subsequent 
differences in imitative fidelity. 
Table 1. Summary of research objectives 
Research Objectives 
1. Can the ritual and instrumental stances be differentially activated using linguistic cues 
in an ecologically valid task? 
2. What are the cognitive processes underlying the different behavioral profiles 
characteristic of the ritual and instrumental stances? 
 
Imitation and instrumental tasks: Beyond physical-causal learning 
An interest in differences in social learning between humans and great apes has 
generated a large literature examining how children use imitation to gain an 
understanding of the physical world. Human children have the unique ability to learn 
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social and instrumental skills through the use of high fidelity imitation, an ability that 
allows for the faithful transmission of information and a resultant cultural continuity 
across generations not found in other species. Chimpanzees, in contrast, have been shown 
to eliminate causally irrelevant actions in situations where the intention of an actor is 
believed to be transparent and the causal structures behind a behavior are apparent, 
resulting in high morbidity levels of causally irrelevant actions (Call & Tomasello, 2008; 
Call, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005; Nagell, Olguin, & Tomasello, 1993; Tomasello, 
Savage-Rumbaugh, & Kruger, 1993; Whiten, Custance, Gomez, Teixidor, & Bard, 1996).  
Thus, this fundamental distinction in social learning between humans and apes 
has resulted in interest about the various cognitive mechanisms surrounding imitation. In 
addition, as an artifact of this link to research in comparative psychology, many of the 
experimental paradigms exploring imitation in young children have made use of tasks 
that are meant to assess understanding of physical-causal relationships. Several studies 
have attempted to examine children’s tendency to engage in overimitation through the 
use of transparent puzzle boxes, a direct result of work with primates (puzzle boxes are 
believed to approximate the processes of dissecting a complex fruit, Nielsen & Tomaselli, 
2010; Call & Tomasello, 2008). In a typical puzzle box task, an adult model instructs a 
child on how to retrieve a desirable toy or sticker while including causally irrelevant 
actions, such as tapping the container or moving a lever that is not connected to the 
functional aspects of the puzzle box. Researchers argue that children should be able to 
identify the causally irrelevant actions in the demonstration as unnecessary in order to 
achieve the goal due to the design of the stimuli that either makes use of transparent 
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elements or a combination of materials believed to be familiar to children,. Children are 
then given the opportunity to engage with the puzzle box themselves, and more times 
than not, children replicate the causally irrelevant actions demonstrated by the adult 
(Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007). 
 To the extent that tasks used in previous research have a clear end goal and 
manipulate physical causal relationships, they can be considered instrumental tasks. 
Contrary to what would be predicted by the premise of the instrumental stance, however, 
children are copying irrelevant actions with high levels of fidelity instead of efficiently 
solving the task by recreating only the necessary actions. One possibility is that instead of 
adopting the instrumental stance while learning about the manipulation of the puzzle 
boxes, children are adopting the ritual stance, thus attending more to the process than to 
the end goal. Although some have argued that children’s tendency to maintain the 
causally irrelevant features is a matter of automatically assigning causal value to all steps 
demonstrated (Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011), others have argued that it 
may simply be an artifact of their interpretation of the task as a behavior they should 
imitate with high fidelity due to the information and contextual cues presented to them 
(Kenward, Karlsson, & Persson, 2011; Over & Carpenter, 2012). What cues are children 
relying on in these tasks to determine that they should imitate rather than innovate?  
Several components of the puzzle box tasks could have led children to interpret 
their presentation as an opportunity for conventional rather than instrumental learning: 
the causal opacity and complex nature of the task (Southgate, Chevallier & Csibra, 2009; 
Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011); the occurrence of pedagogical social cues, such as the 
	  	   7 
presence of an adult model (Gergely & Csibra, 2006); the adult’s purposeful execution of 
the task (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Csibra & Gergely, 2009); and children’s 
affiliative drives or desire to maintain group membership (Over & Carpenter, 2009; 
Watson-Jones, et al., under review). All of these features of the paradigm have been 
demonstrated to increase imitative fidelity among children. 
I propose that the complex and causally opaque nature of the behaviors used in 
previous research on overimitation (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; Williamson & 
Meltzoff, 2011) led to the activation of the ritual stance for these otherwise instrumental 
tasks. When exposed to a novel stimulus, such as a puzzle box, children have no way of 
distinguishing what is and is not necessary due to a level of relative inexperience with 
similar stimuli1 (Southgate, Chevallier & Csibra, 2009; Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011).  
A common misconception in this series of studies is that physical transparency indicates 
causal transparency. Children’s tendency to engage in high fidelity imitation in these 
tasks suggests that even if the parts of a stimulus are physically transparent, the causal 
structures of the sequence executed might not be cognitively transparent. This lack of 
causal transparency and the novelty of the object leaves children to perceive the task as 
difficult and causally opaque, thus increasing their likelihood of engaging in high fidelity 
imitation. When children (and adults) are unsure of the causal structure of an event, they 
are more likely to imitate with high fidelity because they cannot parse what is and is not 
necessary (Legare, et al., under review). In addition, work by Williamson et al. (2008) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lyons et al. (2007) presented two-step training tasks using common household objects 
such as jar that children were told to retrieve a small toy from. These two-step training 
tasks were far removed from the challenge posed by the transparent puzzle box.  
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suggests that when children perceive a task as difficult, they are more likely to imitate the 
exact means used by an adult demonstrator. Despite the instrumental nature of tasks 
previously employed to examine overimitation in children, the ritual stance seems to have 
been activated due to children’s perceptions of the stimulus as unfamiliar and causally 
opaque and therefore difficult to manipulate. 
In sum, in spite of the intentions of the researchers, the materials presented in the 
puzzle box series are more similar to the intentionally opaque action sequences 
previously used in the investigation of the ritual and instrumental stances than actual 
instrumental tasks (Legare et al., under review; Watson-Jones, et al., under review). To 
address this, the present study sought to use materials that preschool-aged children would 
have experience with and could understand from a physical-causal perspective - a 
necklace-making sequence. Unlike a novel puzzle box stimulus, children in a U.S. 
context have experience with bead-stringing and necklace-making activities and 
understand what is instrumentally necessary to make a necklace (i.e., stringing a bead) as 
well as the kinds of behaviors that could be considered conventional (i.e., bead shape and 
color choice, novel gestures).  Thus, high fidelity imitation in the context of the 
presentation of the necklace-making sequence should be the result of an interpretation of 
the event as an opportunity for conventional learning for reasons other than an inability to 
understand the physical-causal components of the novel action sequence.  
 Instead of activating the ritual stance through a lack of causal transparency, the 
present study examined the impact of social cues, specifically language cues, on 
children’s interpretation of events as opportunities for either conventional or instrumental 
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learning. I anticipated that if children rely on given verbal cues to indicate the presence of 
a clear and familiar end-goal before the presentation of a sequence (i.e., “I am going to 
make a necklace.”), information about the end goal will take precedence and children will 
process the event from the perspective of the instrumental stance. If children are not cued 
about the presence of an end goal, and instead  provided conventional explanations for 
the sequence (i.e., “Everyone always does it this way.”) children will approach the event 
from the perspective of the ritual stance, overriding their knowledge of what is and is not 
necessary to make a necklace. 
Cognitive Underpinnings of Imitative Fidelity 
 To date little is known about the cognitive processes underlying the distinct 
behavioral profiles that characterize the ritual and instrumental stances. Are children 
engaging in more high fidelity imitation when the ritual stance is activated because they 
remember the components of the sequence with a higher degree of accuracy than children 
taking an instrumental stance? Do children in the ritual stance innovate or deviate less 
from the demonstrated actions because the demonstrated function of the objects becomes 
a rigidly assigned function? In addition to exploring the extent to which the ritual and 
instrumental stances can be differentially activated for a familiar craft-making task, the 
present study examined the cognitive underpinnings of imitative fidelity to determine 
whether the demonstrated differences in performance between the stances are a matter of 
interpretation or memory. 
 Memory. Previous research has demonstrated that when approaching behavior 
from the ritual stance, children become more adept at accurately identifying differences 
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in performance on similar tasks (Legare et al., under review). From the perspective of 
cultural transmission, this would mean that children are equipped to not only observe and 
learn a new behavior but to assign it conventional meaning. Thus, the observed behavior 
becomes the prototype for that particular kind of behavior. Other behaviors meant to 
approximate the same task are viewed as either conforming to or deviating from this 
prototype. When children then attempt to recreate this behavior, their subsequent 
imitative fidelity should reflect their memory of this prototype. 
 Children who have watched the same behavior from the perspective of the 
instrumental stance, however, should not demonstrate the same behavioral or cognitive 
profile as the children for whom the ritual stance has been activated. Instead of forming a 
prototype of the behavioral pattern and working to detect deviations in performance, they 
should observe new behaviors from the perspective of determining the most effective 
means of achieving the desired end goal. While attempting to recreate the behavior, these 
children shift focus to the end goal and the execution becomes an exploration of the 
different components of the sequence, informed by the child’s observation.  
 Whereas the activation of each stance results in different behavioral outcomes, 
children in both stances are engaging in tasks of great cognitive effort – not only 
attending to the multiple components of behaviors (e.g., gestures, object manipulation, 
verbal utterances), but also determining which aspects they should attempt to recreate.  In 
both instances, children must process and encode multiple components of a behavior 
while taking into consideration the number of performances they have seen in addition to 
the social and contextual cues discussed previously. Thus, if children are attending to the 
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desired behaviors with similar levels of cognitive engagement – what is leading to the 
difference in the behavioral profiles between the stances? Is the manifested behavior a 
result of differential processing and memory or is it simply a matter of interpretation of 
what components of the behavior need to be reproduced? 
 Past work has argued that overimitation is not a matter of a difference in memory, 
but a matter of interpretation and processing (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). When children 
who had previously eliminated some elements of a novel object-action sequence were 
asked to reproduce what an experimenter demonstrated, they were consistently able to 
faithfully recreate the behavior (Williamson & Markman, 2006). Moreover, prior 
experience with stimuli does not seem to lead to a decrease in imitation when novel 
actions with the same stimuli are demonstrated. Children who have knowledge of how 
the stimuli work still recreate the new behaviors faithfully (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010), 
but presumably this is not a result of a lapse in memory of how to successfully 
manipulate the stimuli (i.e., how to extract a prize from a puzzle box). Instead, children 
seem to approach the stimuli with a re-interpretation of what their interactions should be 
comprised of, incorporating the new actions instead of efficiently executing the end goal. 
 Research on transmission chains also provides insight into children’s cognitive 
encoding when learning a new behavior. Working on the assumption that when 
demonstrating a behavior for a peer, children will engage only in those aspects of the 
behavior they deem important, it seems that children are assigning different levels of 
value to the actions they have seen demonstrated. Flynn (2008) found that even though 
the first child in a transmission chain paradigm could be trained to reproduce both 
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causally relevant and causally irrelevant actions, children in later positions in the chain 
eliminated the causally irrelevant actions in their subsequent demonstration for the next 
child. Thus, children have the capacity to remember and execute both conventional 
(causally irrelevant) and instrumental (causally relevant) elements of a novel action 
sequence, but in the absence of other social and conventional cues will assign value to the 
particular components of the action sequence and in turn recreate these valued elements.  
Children are indeed capable of transmitting conventional knowledge and work to 
reinforce norms in contexts where they deem high fidelity imitation as the desired means 
of learning and the reproduction of a specific behavior (Kenward, 2012). It follows that 
their interpretation of a behavior’s purpose, and subsequently the activation of the ritual 
or instrumental stances, will result not in a difference in memory, but in interpretation of 
which aspects of a behavior should be reproduced. Rather than only assessing children’s 
ability to recall a novel sequence, a more nuanced assessment of their processing of the 
sequence can be ascertained through presenting a situation in which they become the 
demonstrator or teacher. Thus, through the implementation of multiple memory 
measures, the present study attempted to gain insight not only what children are 
remembering, but what aspects of the sequence they are assigning value to based on the 
social cues they are provided with. 
 The present study sought to examine the role of memory in children’s imitation in 
both ritual and instrumental conditions, using both a direct measure of memory and an 
indirect evaluation of memory through a simulated peer transmission task. Children were 
asked to directly recall components of the action sequence, particularly the specific 
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objects used, as an objective measure of attention to and memory of the sequence (see 
Immediate recall task) and were also asked to model the behavior demonstrated by the 
experimenter for a puppet, meant to approximate a peer (Kenward, 2012; Rakoczy, 
Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008; see Teaching task). Together, these measures were 
intended to provide further insight into whether or not memory differences for the 
sequence exist and if children interpret different components of the action sequence as 
important depending on the activation of the ritual or instrumental stances. I predicted 
that children would not show differences in memory across stances, but when asked to 
reproduce the sequence for purposes of information transmission, children in the ritual 
condition would reproduce more of the causally irrelevant and conventional components 
in their demonstration. 
 Functional fixedness. A crucial component of the ritual stance is not only an 
increase in imitative fidelity, but also a decrease in innovative actions using the materials 
presented (Legare, et al., under review).  It has been found that children are less likely to 
engage in innovation or use the objects in a novel manner once the ritual stance is 
activated seemingly assigning the demonstrated functions to objects used in the action 
sequence and not deviating from these assignments (Legare, et al., under review; Watson-
Jones, et al., under review). For example, in previous work, children are presented with a 
series of object manipulation actions and then see an object used to open a box. When the 
ritual stance is activated, children are less likely to use object other than the demonstrated 
object to open the box (Legare, et al., under review). Whereas other objects certainly 
have the affordance of being able to be used to open the box (and are used by children 
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interpreting the process from the instrumental stance), there appears to be a reduction in 
children’s flexibility of object use so that, to borrow from German & Defeyter (2000), the 
object appears to become “functionally fixed.” 
 Functional fixedness, or the interpretation of an object’s function as that for which 
it was originally designed or the capacity demonstrated (German & Defeyter, 2000), may 
be part of the reason children in the ritual stance are less likely to engage in innovation or 
divert from the demonstrated components of a novel behavior. Indeed, when children 
approach the world, they are presented with a variety of objects that have been designed 
for a specific purpose (German & Barrett, 2005; Tomasello, 1999) and serve as more or 
less ritualized objects. Paper towel holders, apple slicers, beverage frothers – any 
American kitchen will reveal a variety of these objects designed and typically used for a 
specific purpose (which is often inherent in their all-too-creative names). How is it that 
the other affordances of these objects are overlooked? The answer may be functional 
fixedness as a result of learning about these objects in a conventional way or from the 
perspective of the ritual stance. 
 This concept may be best understood in the context of an actual ritualized object, 
for example, the Catholic rosary. A rosary can be worn as a decorative element (i.e., a 
necklace), but it is meant to serve as a prayer guide, and therefore its use as a necklace is 
rare and often not condoned. How is it that the rosary comes to occupy this very specific 
niche? One possible explanation could be that the rosary becomes functionally fixed as a 
result of being initially processed from the perspective of the ritual stance (i.e., the 
	  	   15 
contextual and social cues surrounding the way it is presented leave children to interpret 
its use as conventional). 
 German and colleagues have found that functional fixedness is a common part of 
adult cognition cross-culturally (German & Barrett, 2005), but children younger than six 
years-old appear to be immune to functional fixedness and are quite flexible in their 
reasoning about object use (Defeyter & German, 2003; German & Defeyter, 2000). 
Functional fixedness has been typically assessed through a problem-solving task in which 
an individual must suspend their understanding of an object’s function when that function 
is being primed, in order to use the object in a different way. For example, children must 
use a box that is holding materials as a stool in order to reach a desired object.  In order to 
do so, children must suspend their understanding of a box as an item that holds things, in 
order to use it for a novel purpose, to reach something. German and colleagues refer to 
the box whose function has been primed as preutilized –  in essence, it is being presented 
in a way in which its main function is already in play. Children who demonstrate 
functional fixedness are not only less likely to solve the task when an object is 
preutilized, but when they do solve the task, they take much longer than peers for whom 
the primary function of the object has not been primed (Defeyter & German, 2003; 
German & Defeyter, 2000). 
 If functional fixedness contributes to the ritual stance as predicted, it follows that 
when children are presented with objects in a ritualistic manner, they will be less likely to 
use these objects in a novel way. Moreover, given that children younger than 6 years-old 
are susceptible to the social and contextual cues surrounding the ritual stance (Herrmann, 
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et al., in preparation; Legare, et al., under review; Watson-Jones, et al., under review), it 
is possible that functional fixedness can be activated in children previously thought to be 
immune to functional fixedness as a result of the ritual stance. The proposed study seeks 
to explore the extent to which functional fixedness is a potential mechanism difference in 
imitative fidelity between the ritual and instrumental stances by presenting children with 
a problem-solving task in which they must overcome the primed function of objects 
previously presented in either a conventional or instrumental manner. I predict that 
children in the ritual condition will be less likely to solve the task and when they do so 
will take longer to solve the task than children in the instrumental condition.  Moreover, 
given the saliency of the ritual and instrumental stances to young children, I anticipate 
that children under the age of six will demonstrate higher levels of functional fixedness in 
the ritual condition, reducing young children’s immunity to functional fixedness. 
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Methods 
Participants 
 Sixty 3-4-year-olds (37 females; M age = 3.97, age range 2,11 – 4,11) and sixty-
five 5-6-year-olds (38 females; M age = 5.80, age range 5,0 – 6,11) were recruited from 
preschools and a children’s museum in an urban university town in the American 
southwest. Children were primarily Euro-American and from middle class families. Data 
from 17 additional participants were dropped due to experimenter error, equipment 
malfunction, or participant refusal to participate in all components of the study. Twenty-
eight 5-6-year-olds (11 females, M age = 5.89, age range 5,0 - 6,11) were recruited from 
the same setting for a baseline measure after participating in an unrelated study.  
Procedure 
All children in the study were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in a 
between-subjects design. In the instrumental condition, children were given either an 
instrumental explanation of a task (e.g. “I am going to make a necklace.”) and in the 
ritual condition children were given conventional explanation (e.g. “Everyone always 
does it this way.”). During the course of the study, children participated in five tasks: a 
memory game (warm up) task, an imitation task, an immediate recall task, a teaching 
task, and a functional fixedness task. First, children were presented with a memory game 
using pictures of fruit and vegetables to build rapport with the researcher (warm-up 
game). The researcher then presented a novel action sequence that resulted in the 
construction of a necklace. After demonstration of the action sequence, children engaged 
in an imitation task (imitation task). Children then participated in an immediate recall 
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task about the action sequence presented by the researcher. A teaching task in which the 
children taught a puppet how to complete the demonstrated task will followed the 
questions and recall task. At the end of the study, 4, 5, and 6-year old children were 
presented with a functional fixedness problem-solving task. Pilot data showed that the 
functional fixedness problem-solving task was too difficult for 3 year-old children so they 
completed the study after the teaching task.  
Children in the baseline measure were asked if they would like to play an 
additional game after the completion of an unrelated study examining children’s 
explanation-seeking behaviors. Children who completed the baseline measure did not 
participate in any other component of the study.  
Warm-up game  
At the beginning of the testing period, children were presented with a set of three 
different target pictures – an apple, a green pepper, and a lemon (Figure 1a). The 
researcher told the children that they would be picking these pictures out from other sets 
of pictures and once the children had demonstrated an understanding of the task at hand, 
the researcher showed the children three additional sets of pictures (1 – broccoli, apple, 
potato, 2 – pepper, tomato, lime, 3 – celery, strawberry, lemon) and asked them “Have I 
shown you any of these pictures before?” (For images used, see Figure 1b-1d) This task 
was used for both rapport building and establishing an attentive mindset in the children. 
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Imitation task  
After building rapport with the researcher through the picture memory game, the 
research placed a set of necklace-making materials on the table in front of them and 
children were given one of two prompts: 
1. Instrumental condition – “Now we are going to do something new. I am going to 
make a necklace. Let’s watch what I am doing. I am going to make a necklace”.  
OR 
2. Ritual condition– “Now we are going to do something new. I always do it this 
way. Everyone always does it this way. Let’s watch what I am doing. Everyone 
always does it this way”.  
Following the verbal prompt the researcher demonstrated a sequence resulting in 
the construction of a necklace (for an outline of the action sequence, see Table 2; for an 
outline with pictures, see Figure 2 in the appendix). Children in both conditions viewed 
the same action sequence.  
After the task demonstration, children were provided with an unstructured 
opportunity to engage with the objects used in the necklace construction sequence. The 
researcher gave the children a duplicate set of the same items used by the researcher, 
positioned and oriented the same way as at the beginning of the action sequence (Figure 
3). While the researcher moved the tray of objects toward the child she said, “Here you 
go. Now it’s your turn!” Children’s engagement with the objects were video-recorded 
and coded for imitative fidelity and construction variability. If help is sought from the 
researcher, the child was given a neutral answer such as “Do your best!” or “What do you 
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think you should do?” At the end of engagement or after 90 seconds, the objects were 
moved out of the child’s reach but remain in view.  
Table 2. Necklace construction sequence 
Action Description 
1. Choose string Pick up red string with each end in one hand 
2. Novel string 
actions 
Stretch out the string and then bring the ends together (repeat once) 
3. String placement Place straight string above the top of the tray holding the stimuli 
4. Purple bead Pick up purple bead with right hand 
5. First forehead 
touch 
Touch purple bead to forehead with right hand while left hand picks 
up right end of the string 
6. String purple 
bead 
Right hand brings purple bead down to the end of the string in left 
hand, string bead and move to the middle of the string 
7. Yellow bead Pick up yellow bead with right hand 
8. Second forehead 
touch 
Touch yellow bead to forehead with right hand while left hand 
picks up right end of the string 
9. String yellow 
bead 
Right hand brings yellow bead down to the end of the string in left 
hand, strings bead and moves to middle of string 
10. Green bead Pick up green bead with right hand 
11. Third forehead 
touch 
Touch green bead to forehead with right hand while left hand picks 
up right end of the string 
12. String green 
bead 
Right hand brings green bead down to the end of the string in left 
hand, moves bead on to the middle of the string 
13. Hold up Pick up one end of string with each hand, hold necklace up and 
declare, “Look what I did!” 
 
Baseline measure.  A baseline measure examining children’s interaction with the 
imitation task stimuli was run in order to examine children’s spontaneous tendencies to 
explore the stimuli and to ensure that the imitation task is leading children to engage in 
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behaviors that are not typical. A research assistant presented each child in the baseline 
condition with the stimuli set-up as they would be in the imitation task and asked, 
“Would you like to play with these?” Children’s engagement with the objects was video-
recorded. At the end of engagement, or after 90 seconds, the objects were removed from 
the child’s reach.  
Coding: Imitation task. 
Imitative fidelity score. A research assistant who is blind to the condition to which 
each child has been allocated coded children’s interactions with the imitation task stimuli. 
Following the analysis structure of Over & Carpenter (2009), Legare, et al. (under 
review) and Watson, et al. (under review), each child were each given a summary score 
between 0 and 5 that was indicative of the number of target behaviors of the modeled 
necklace construction sequence they replicated (the table below illustrates scoring 
procedures)2. Data from 25% of the sample was independently coded to assess inter-rater 
reliability. The second coder was blind to the hypotheses of the study and the condition to 
which each child was assigned. Reliability was calculated for the imitative fidelity score 
and coders demonstrated 100% agreement with the Kappa for this coding falling within 
very good agreement (.81 and above) levels (Landis & Koch, 1977). Each of the actions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Originally the summary score consisted of an additional component – using only one 
side of the string to string beads as demonstrated – for a total of six components.  This 
sixth component was eliminated due to baseline measurements (see baseline measure) 
that found that over 50% of children naturally only used one side of the string to string 
beads. Given that this was a common behavior, it is not anticipated that including this 
behavior in an imitation score would capture behavior above and beyond what would 
naturally occur if children were engaging with the stimuli without a demonstrated action 
sequence.   
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included in Table 3 was also analyzed using non-parametric tests to examine frequency 
of engagement across conditions and age groups. 
Baseline measure. A research assistant familiar with the imitative fidelity score coding 
schema coded children’s interactions with the stimuli. Each child’s interactions were 
coded for the occurrence of six different behaviors – the components of the imitative 
fidelity score (see Table 3) and one additional component that was originally considered 
as part of the imitative fidelity score – only using one side of the string to string beads. 
Children were given a 1 if they engaged in the behavior and a 0 if they did not and 
frequencies were recorded for each target behavior. 
Table 3. Imitative fidelity score components 
Component of 
action sequence 
Description of model’s (R) 
behavior 
Operational criteria for a 
correct response 
1.  Stretch string
  
R brings the ends of the string 
together and then opens it twice 
The child brings the ends of the 
string together and opens it at 
least once. 
2. Place string R lays the string out on the table 
above the tray 
The child lays the string out on 
the table either in front of or 
behind the tray. 
3. Three bead to 
forehead touches 
R touches the purple, yellow, & 
green beads to forehead before 
placing them on the string 
The child touches three beads s 
to their forehead before placing 
them on the string 
4. Final necklace 
– circle, square, 
circle 
R’s necklace consists of three 
beads in order– a circular bead, a 
square bead, and a circular bead 
The child’s necklace consists 
of a circular bead, a block 
bead, and a circular bead in 
order 
5. Three beads R’s necklace consists of only 
three beads 
The child’s necklace consists 
of only three beads 
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Innovation score. A research assistant who was blind to the condition to which 
each child has been allocated coded children’s interactions with the imitation task stimuli. 
Children were given a summary score between 0 and 6 that was indicative of the amount 
of variability in their construction of their necklace (i.e. behaviors that differ from those 
the researcher modeled; see Table 4). Data from 25% of the sample was independently 
coded to assess inter-rater reliability. The second coder was blind to the hypotheses of the 
study and the condition to which each child was assigned. Reliability was calculated for 
the imitative fidelity score and coders demonstrated 100% agreement with the Kappa for 
this coding falling within very good agreement (.81 and above) levels (Landis & Koch, 
1977).  
 
Table 4. Innovation score components  
Behavior Description 
1. String choice The child selects the green string to build the necklace. 
2. First bead The child does not select a circle bead first. 
3. Second bead The child does not select a block bead second. 
4. Third bead The child does not select a circle bead third. 
5. Final 
necklace 
The child constructs a necklace that does not consist of a 
circular bead, a block bead, and a circular bead.  
6. Three beads The child’s necklace consists of less/more than three beads. 
 
Immediate Recall Task 
 Immediately following the imitation task questions, the researcher told the children, 
“I forgot what I did! Can you help me remember what I did?” Children were then 
presented with two sets of stimuli sequentially (Figure 4): 
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1. Both strings present on the stimuli tray during the necklace construction task. 
2. The beads present on the stimuli tray during the necklace construction task in the 
same positions.  
The order of presentation was counterbalanced, with the researcher presenting 
half of the children with the strings first and half of the children with the beads first. 
While the researcher presented each child with the strings she asked, “Do you remember 
which string I used?” For the beads, the researcher first asked which beads were used, 
“Which of these did I use?” and then asked about the order in which the beads were used, 
“Which bead did I use first? Second? Third?” The researcher repeated the children’s 
responses for confirmation and clarity. Children’s responses were evaluated for accuracy. 
Immediate Recall Task Coding. Children’s responses were scored for correctness, 
with each correct response being given a point. Children could earn a score between 0 
and 7. Scores will be assigned based on the children’s answers to the following questions: 
string color used (1 pt); beads used - purple (1 pt), yellow (1 pt), green (1 pt); order of 
beads - purple first (1 pt), yellow second (1 pt), green third (1 pt). A point was eliminated 
from each child’s score if they named more than three beads as having been used in order 
to account for those children who would receive points due to naming all beads.  
Teaching task 
After the completion of the immediate recall task, the children were introduced to 
a bear hand puppet named Alex. The children were told that Alex would like to learn 
what the researcher did. The researcher then asked the children if they could help Alex 
learn what the researcher did and presented a tray containing the stimuli used in the 
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imitation task. At this point, in order to capture natural peer teaching behaviors, the 
researcher sat Alex next to the tray and made Alex look from the children to the tray and 
back to the child. If the children did not begin to engage with Alex after a period of 20 
seconds, the experimenter prompt the children by repeating, “Alex would like to learn 
what I did. Can you help Alex learn what I did?” 
The researcher used Alex to carry out any actions indicated by the children. If the 
children chose to engage in the action sequence themselves as a means of demonstrative 
teaching, the researcher positioned Alex so that he appeared to be watching the action 
sequence and would move his head and arms in ways that indicated he was attentive.  
Children’s behaviors were video-recorded and coded for imitative fidelity 
(whether or not they made the same necklace as the model originally demonstrated). 
Teaching task coding. Children’s reconstruction (either through guided instruction 
to the puppet or demonstrative teaching) of the necklace was coded for imitative rigidity 
and assigned an imitation score from 0 to 5 based on the rubric presented for the imitative 
fidelity score.  
Functional fixedness task 
At the conclusion of the study session, children were presented with a problem-
solving task similar to that used by German and Defeyter (2000). The researcher showed 
them a wooden box consisting of three walls and a floor (Figure 5). On the back wall of 
the house, there was a shelf. In front of the box there was  a collection of objects. 
Children were then introduced to Bobo the bear, a small bear toy, and informed that this 
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box is Bobo the bear’s house. A tiger toy was then placed on the back shelf and the 
children were told: 
“This is Bobo the bear. Bobo’s favorite toy lion is up on this shelf. 
Bobo wants to get his toy lion from the shelf, but he can’t because 
he is too short and he cannot jump to reach the toy because he has 
short legs. Bobo has all of these things in his room. Can you help 
him reach his toy using any of these things?” 
 
The objects on the table will be a wooden box with a lid, two wooden blocks, a 
pencil, a toy car, a ball, a flat magnet, a coin and either the assembled necklace from the 
imitation task (preutilization condition, Figure 6a) or the string and beads the final 
necklace in the imitation task placed next to each other (non-preutilization condition, 
Figure 6b).  Half of the children in each group (ritual and instrumental) will be assigned 
randomly to one of the two functional fixedness conditions (preutilization and non-
preutilization). Assignment to functional fixedness category will be balanced across more 
strict age groups, with each age being examined separately (i.e., 4, 5, & 6 year-olds were 
each their own age group)3. 
The wooden blocks and box can be stacked to make a structure that when 
combined with Bobo’s height will not be tall enough to allow the bear to reach the shelf. 
In order for Bobo to reach the shelf, the children needed to use all three of the beads from 
the imitation task in addition to the box and the blocks (Figure 7).  
If children sought advice, they were given neutral responses, such as “What do 
you think you should do?” or “Do your best!” If children offered an incorrect solution to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Three year-olds in the pilot phases of the study showed consistent difficulty in 
understanding the prompt, indicating that the task used to assess functional fixedness was 
beyond three year-olds cognitive capacities. For this reason, three year-olds completed 
the study after the teaching task. 
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the problem (i.e. Bobo could not actually reach the toy, the researcher showed them that 
Bobo could not reach the toy and encouraged them to seek another solution by asking, “Is 
there anything else Bobo could use to get to his toy?” or “Bobo has all of these things in 
his room!” 
Children’s interactions with the problem solving task were video-recorded and 
coded for object use in addition to the amount of time it took for them to solve the task.  
If functional fixedness is an underlying cognitive component of the ritual stance than 
children in the ritual preutilization condition were anticipated to show the lowest rates of 
solving the problem, lower than children in the instrumental preutilization condition. 
Children in the ritual-preutilization condition were also anticipated to take the longest to 
solve the problem, followed by children in the instrumental preutilization condition. 
Children in both the ritual non-preutilization and instrumental non-preutilization 
conditions were expected to show equal rates of solving the problem and solve the 
problem the fastest. 
Children’s inability to solve the task could represent their hesitancy or inability to 
assign a new purpose to the beads other than that that was demonstrated (although it 
could also represent a general misunderstanding of the task at hand). By presenting the 
children with the necklace from the action sequence in its final form, the functional 
fixedness problem forces the children to reconsider their understanding of the object 
moving from a whole units to functional parts. Comparing children in both the 
instrumental and ritual conditions allows for an assessment of whether or not the ritual 
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condition amplifies children’s encoding of objects as functionally fixed with the 
instrumental-preutilization condition serving as a control.  
Functional fixedness coding. Children were scored on whether or not they use the 
beads and the string as separate entities from the necklace in their solution to the problem 
and the amount of time that elapses before they solve the problem. If children took longer 
than 180 seconds to solve the task, they were coded as not solving the task. 
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Results 
Baseline. Frequencies (reported as percentage of children engaging in target 
action) for each target action are reported in Table 5. No children demonstrated the novel 
actions assessed by the imitative fidelity score (stretch string, place string, & bead to 
forehead touches). Children rarely made necklaces using a circle bead, square bead, circle 
bead pattern and less than one-third of baseline children used only three beads on there 
necklace. The only target action that occurred with notable frequency was only using one 
side of the string to place beads on the string. Due to the high frequency of this behavior 
in the baseline assessment, it was removed from the imitative fidelity score.  
Table 5. Frequency of target actions in baseline measure 
Target Action Operational criteria for a correct    
response 
Frequency 
Stretch string The child brings the ends of the string 
together and opens it at least once. 
0% 
Place string The child lays the string out on the table 
either in front of or behind the tray. 
0% 
Bead to forehead touches The child touches a bead to their 
forehead before placing it on the string 
0% 
Final necklace – circle, 
square, circle 
The child’s necklace consists of a 
circular bead, a block bead, and a 
circular bead in order 
11% 
Three beads The child’s necklace consists of only 
three beads 
29.6% 
Same side The child only uses one side of the 
string to string the beads. 
52.9% 
 
Imitative fidelity. As anticipated, children engaged in higher levels of imitative 
behavior in the ritual condition than in the instrumental condition. Contrary to 
predictions, however, there was not an effect of age and children showed similar 
imitative patterns in each age group. A 2x2 ANOVA with imitative fidelity summary 
score as the dependent measure and condition (2: ritual and instrumental) and age group 
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(2: 3-4 year-olds and 5-6 year-olds) as between subjects factors revealed a main effect of 
condition, F(1, 115) = 15.13, p < .001 but no main effect of age F(1, 115) = 2.99, p = .09. 
There was not a significant interaction between condition and age F(1, 115) = 1.33, p = 
.25. Children in the ritual condition had higher imitative fidelity scores (M = 2.23, SD = 
1.33) than children in the instrumental condition (M = 1.34, SD = 1.21; Figure 8). For a 
summary of Pearson Chi-Square scores of individual components of the imitative fidelity 
score, see Table 6. 
Table 6. Pearson Chi-Square Coefficients for elements of Imitative Fidelity Score 
Target Action X2 p 
Stretch string X2 (1, N = 119) = 15.23 p < .0001 
Place string X2 (1, N = 119) = 1.89 p = .17 
Three bead to forehead 
touches 
X2 (1, N = 119) = 6.47 p < .05 
Final necklace – circle, 
square, circle 
X2 (1, N = 119) = 3.89 p < .05 
Three beads X2 (1, N = 119) = 1.89 p = .17 
  
Innovation score. Contrary to predictions, children did not engage in different 
levels of innovation across conditions. A 2x2 ANOVA with innovation summary score as 
the dependent measure and condition (2: ritual and instrumental) and age group (2: 3-4 
year-olds and 5-6 year-olds) as between subjects factors did not indicate a main effect of 
condition, F(1, 99) = 0.94, p = .33 or a main effect of age F(1, 99) = 0.19, p = .66. There 
was not a significant interaction between condition and age F(1, 99) = 0.93, p = .34. 
There was not a significant difference in innovation scores between children in the ritual 
condition (M = 3.32, SD = 1.77) and children in the instrumental condition (M = 2.98, SD 
= 1.86; Figure 9).  
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Immediate recall. As predicted, children in the ritual and instrumental conditions 
demonstrated similar immediate recall abilities. A 2x2 ANOVA with immediate recall 
score as the dependent measure and condition (2: ritual and instrumental) and age group 
(2: 3-4 year-olds and 5-6 year-olds) as between subjects factors did not indicate a main 
effect of condition, F(1, 99) = 2.92, p = .09 or a main effect of age F(1, 99) = 2.52, p = 
.12. There was not a significant interaction between condition and age F(1, 99) = 0.04, p 
= .85. There was not a significant difference in immediate recall scores between children 
in the ritual condition (M = 3.32, SD = 1.77) and children in the instrumental condition 
(M = 2.98, SD = 1.86; Figure 10). 
Teaching task imitative fidelity. As anticipated, children engaged in higher levels 
of imitative fidelity in the ritual condition than in the instrumental condition when 
demonstrating the task for a puppet. Moreover, older children showed higher levels of 
imitative fidelity than younger children. A 2x2 ANOVA with teaching task imitative 
fidelity summary score as the dependent measure and condition (2: ritual and 
instrumental) and age group (2: 3-4 year-olds and 5-6 year-olds) as between subjects 
factors revealed a main effect of condition, F(1, 86) = 6.52, p < .05 and a main effect of 
age, F(1, 86) = 6.82, p < 0.05. There was not a significant interaction between condition 
and age, F(1, 86) = 0.40, p = .53. Five and six year-old children had higher imitative 
fidelity scores (M = 2.09, SD = 1.29) than three and four year-old children (M = 1.33, SD 
= 1.43).  Children in the ritual condition had higher imitative fidelity scores (M = 2.09, 
SD = 1.52) than children (M = 1.36, SD = 1.2) in the instrumental condition (Figure 11).  
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Functional fixedness. As evidenced in Table 7, children in the ritual-preutilization 
condition showed the smallest proportion of solving the task using the beads from the 
necklace across all age groups. Older children were better at solving the task overall X2 
(2, N = 97) = 11.62, p < 0.01. Subsequent analyses revealed that 4 year-olds solved the 
tasks at significantly lower rates than 5 year-olds (Fisher’s exact test, p < .01) and 6 year-
olds (Fisher’s exact test, p < .01) but no significant differences between 5 year-olds and 6 
year-olds (Fisher’s exact test, p = .78; Figure 12). Because there were no differences 
between 5- and 6-year-olds’ performances, they were collapsed for purposes of analyses.  
Four year-olds did not demonstrate significant differences in the proportion of 
children solving the task across conditions (two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, p = .12). 
Planned non-parametric comparisons demonstrated that four year-olds did not show a 
significant difference in performance between the ritual preutilization and the 
instrumental preutilization conditions (the target comparison of the measure; one-tailed 
Fisher’s exact test, p = .45) or between the ritual non-preutilization and the instrumental 
non-preutilization conditions (two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, p = 1.0). Five and six year-
olds collapsed demonstrated significant differences in the proportion of children solving 
the task across conditions (two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, p < .05). The difference between 
the propotion of the children solving the task in the ritual preutilization condition and in 
the instrumental preutilization condition reached marginal significance (one-tailed 
Fisher’s exact test, p = .07) for five and six year-olds. As anticipated, there was no 
difference in the proportion of children in each non-preutilization condition solving the 
task (two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, p = .38).  
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Although the mean time taken to solve the problem was the highest in the ritual 
preutilization condition for five and six year-olds4 (see Table 7) as anticipated, when five 
and six year-olds’ solution times were analyzed together there was not a significant 
difference in solution times across conditions (F (3,44) = 1.04, p = 0.39; Figure 13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Only one 4 year-old solved the task in the ritual preutilization condition, therefore this 
time is not regarded as a comprehensive representation of solution time.	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Discussion 
The findings from this study shed light both on children’s use of imitation as a 
tool for learning in their daily activities and on some of the cognitive mechanisms 
potentially underlying the distinct behavior profiles children manifest in the ritual and 
instrumental stances.  
 As predicted, after being cued with a either a conventional, social language prime 
(ritual condition) or a goal-oriented language prime (instrumental condition) and then 
exposed to a novel, but causally accessible task, children in the ritual condition engaged 
in higher levels of imitative fidelity than children in the instrumental condition. Thus, 
language cues referencing group norms may activate the ritual stance and lead children to 
interpret the task as an opportunity for learning through high fidelity imitation. 
Alternatively, language cues referencing a clear end goal may activate the instrumental 
stance and lead children to seek out efficient means for executing the given goal, rather 
than engaging in high levels of imitative fidelity. 
  Additionally, as predicted, both groups of children showed similar immediate 
recall abilities when asked about the materials used to make the necklace and the order of 
the sequence, but children in the ritual condition engaged in higher levels of imitative 
fidelity when asked to help a puppet (approximating a peer) learn the sequence, 
indicating that the different behavioral profiles manifested by the groups may not be a 
matter of memory but rather a matter of interpretation. Moreover, as children age, they 
appear to transmit behaviors with higher levels of imitative fidelity. This difference in 
imitative fidelity across ages could represent children’s developing cognitive reasoning 
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abilities through ontogeny. An additional component of the difference between the 
stances may be the ritual stance’s activation of functional fixedness for the objects 
presented. as children in the ritual condition were less likely to solve a task that required 
disassembling a necklace similar to that constructed in the study.   
Imitation and ecologically valid tasks 
The types of behaviors children imitated with high fidelity differed between the 
conditions further suggesting that children were aware of the different causal components 
of the task and relied on social contexts to determine when to use this knowledge. 
Children in the ritual condition were more likely to recreate the behaviors that were 
causally irrelevant to the construction of the necklace such as stretching the string and 
touching the beads to their foreheads. Children in the ritual condition were also more 
likely to recreate a more nuanced version of the necklace – one with the clear circle bead, 
square bead, circle bead pattern demonstrated – which from a causal perspective in the 
construction of a necklace could be deemed irrelevant. Children in the instrumental 
condition were more likely to eliminate these elements from their construction of the 
necklace, perhaps because they understood that stretching the string and placing the 
beads to their foreheads were not directly causally related to the actual act of making a 
necklace as they had been instructed. Interestingly, children in both conditions were 
equally likely to make necklaces with only three beads. This indicates that perhaps 
children in the instrumental condition are sensitive to the outcome of an action sequence, 
but not to the level of detail demonstrated by the children in the ritual condition who 
would also used three beads, but in the configuration demonstrated by the model.  
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These differences in behavior are more striking when considering that the only 
difference in manipulation between the two conditions was whether the children were 
given a social, conventional language cue or a goal-oriented, instrumental language cue. 
Children saw the same action sequence with the same stimuli from a live model, thus any 
differences in performance can only be attributed to the different language cues rather 
than differences in the complexity or causal ambiguity of the stimuli or different amounts 
of pedagogical cuing. The different behavioral profiles manifested by children in each 
condition (i.e., higher levels of imitative fidelity, lower levels of behavioral variability for 
children in the ritual condition and lower levels of imitative fidelity, higher levels of 
behavioral variability for children in the instrumental condition) based on this social cue 
manipulation further support the distinction between the ritual and instrumental stances in 
children’s learning.  
Indeed, it should be noted that children imitated with some fidelity regardless of 
condition indicating that the ritual and instrumental stances should not be regarded as a 
binary but rather as two lenses for approaching different opportunities for learning that 
can and do overlap. Given that children in both conditions were placed in front of a live 
model that was actively demonstrating a new behavior for them while attending to them 
as individuals, in other words, engaging children with high levels of pedagogical cuing 
(Gergely & Csibra, 2006) there is no surprise that children incorporated some of the 
modeled actions into their own behaviors regardless of condition. Further research is 
needed to investigate children’s learning outside of this very specific laboratory model of 
exploring children’s behavior.  
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The action sequence presented in the study approximated the types of materials and 
tasks that children in the United States interact with in their typical environments. 
Because of this, the task addressed limitations of previous research on overimitation and 
high fidelity imitation by presenting children with an action sequence that was causally 
accessible due to familiarity. Unlike previous studies with puzzle boxes believed to be 
causally transparent due to actual transparent elements (Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & 
Keil, 2011; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007) or tasks with intentionally novel materials such 
as Velcro hair curlers (Callaghan et al., 2011), the present study relied on materials that 
children could not only find, but also typically interact with in their homes or preschool 
classrooms. The present study demonstrates that previously documented cases of 
overimitation where the causal structures are apparent to adults may not be due to 
children’s automatic causal encoding of novel behaviors, but rather the activation of the 
ritual stance caused by the novelty and complexity of the stimuli.  
Future research will build upon this drive to engage children in ecologically valid 
learning situations and will examine children’s imitation outside of the 
experimenter/child set-up common to previous imitation research. Rogoff and colleagues 
have suggested differences in learning in third-party observation where children are 
placed on the periphery of a demonstration (Correa-Chávez & Rogoff, 2009; López, 
Correa-Chávez, Rogoff, & Gutiérrez, 2010; Rogoff, 2003; Silva, Correa-Chávez, & 
Rogoff, 2010), which would help to answer how much of children’s imitation is due to a 
desire to replicate a behavior for the model and how much is due to their drive to learn a 
new behavior. Providing children with a familiar model, such as a parent or teacher, 
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might also provide further insight into how children use imitation as a tool for learning in 
their daily experiences. Given the concurrence in sociocultural and evolutionary 
developmental psychology theory that children’s development is a collaborative process 
between children and their caretakers (Bjorklund, Hubertz, & Reubens, 2004; Csibra & 
Gergely, 2006; 2011; Gauvain, 2001; Lancy, Bock, & Gaskins, 2009; Rogoff, 1990, 
1998, 2003; Tudge, Putnam, & Valsiner, 1996; Valsiner & Van der Veer, 1988; Wertsch 
& Tulviste, 1992), examining child-parent interaction in regard to imitation is a natural 
and necessary step in gaining a full understanding of children’s use of imitation. In 
addition to these more quasi-experimental studies, there is also much to be gained from 
examining children’s behavior in more naturalistic environments such as preschools, 
homes, and playgrounds. Observational research can provide insight to the types of social 
and contextual cues that children rely on to determine when to engage in high fidelity 
imitation as a tool for social learning.  
The cognitive underpinnings of the ritual and instrumental stances 
 Previous research on children’s high fidelity imitation has focused primarily on 
the act of imitating rather than the potential cognitive mechanisms behind said imitation. 
The present study attempted to explore the different cognitive processes underlying high 
fidelity imitation. While examining the cognitive underpinnings of the ritual and 
instrumental stances, the predominant goal was to determine whether the demonstrated 
differences in behavioral profiles between the stances are a matter of interpretation or 
memory. 
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 Memory.  The findings from this study support a difference in interpretation over 
a difference in memory as one of the factors underlying the divergence in imitative 
fidelity between the stances. When prompted with an immediate recall task, children in 
both conditions showed similar levels of recall, but when asked to recreate the sequence 
for a peer, children in the ritual condition demonstrated higher levels of imitative fidelity 
than children in the instrumental condition. Thus, even though children’s accessible 
memory of the sequence is arguably similar, it appears that children are placing different 
values on the components of the action sequences in the ritual and instrumental stances.  
Previous research has suggested that that overimitation is not a matter of a 
difference in memory, but a matter of interpretation (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). When 
prompted to recreate a modeled action sequence just as a researcher has done, children 
are capable of faithfully reproducing the action sequence even when they have eliminated 
components in previous interactions with the stimuli presented (Williamson & Markman, 
2006). Thus, the differences in imitative fidelity observed between the stances should be 
a consequence of interpretation rather than memory. Research examining the ritual and 
instrumental stances, however, has found that children in the ritual stance become more 
adept at accurately identifying actors’ differences in performance on similar tasks (i.e. 
tasks with the same stimuli, perceivable end-goal; Legare et al., under review). If children 
are recalling the components of the novel action sequences with similar levels of 
accuracy across conditions, why does this divergence in difference detection exist? 
Similar immediate recall abilities across conditions support the possibility that 
children are attending to the sequence with similar levels of attention and memory. Both 
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sets of children are engaging in tasks of significant cognitive effort to determine which 
behaviors are relevant to each of their specific goals (either the recreation of the 
demonstrated sequence or efficient end goal execution) but demonstrate a difference in 
interpretation of what components of the behavior need to be attended to and reproduced.  
When children initially observe a new behavior, if social and contextual cues lead to 
the activation of the ritual stance, then the observed behavior becomes the prototype for 
that particular kind of behavior. When processing other behaviors meant to approximate 
the same task, children compare them to this prototype and can identify similarities and 
differences between their executions. In their own behaviors, children in the ritual stance 
should also work to recreate this prototype to the best of their ability.  
In the instrumental stance, rather than forming a prototype of the behavioral pattern, 
children are shifting focus to the most efficient execution end goal. In this instance, 
children are attending to the full sequence in order to determine what actions are and 
what actions are not necessary to execute the end goal rather than to encode the sequence 
in and of itself. When attending to subsequent behaviors that approximate the observed 
behavior, children process the different components as more or less effective rather than 
as deviations from a prototypical sequence. In their own behaviors children will work to 
execute the end goal in the most efficient way available to them, incorporating 
information from each demonstration. 
Children’s different levels of imitative fidelity in their demonstrations of the action 
sequence for a puppet approximating a peer across conditions provides further support for 
differences in interpretation of novel behavioral sequences as an explanation for the 
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divergent behavioral profiles seen in the ritual and instrumental stances. When asked to 
help a bear puppet learn what the experimenter had done children in the ritual condition 
recreated the sequence with higher fidelity than children in the instrumental condition. 
This indicates that children in the ritual condition demonstrated the causally irrelevant or 
conventional aspects of the sequence, such as string stretching and bead to forehead 
touches more than children in the instrumental condition. In contrast, children in the 
instrumental condition labored to make a necklace without much regard to the sequence 
previously demonstrated by the experimenter. Research on children’s transmission of 
novel behaviors from peer to peer (transmission chains) suggests that when 
demonstrating a behavior for a peer, children tend to replicate those aspects of the 
behavior that they deem important (Flynn, 2008). Thus, it seems that children are 
assigning different levels of value to the actions they see demonstrated based on the 
activation of the instrumental or ritual stance and in turn recreating those actions when 
asked to demonstrate the behavior for a peer. 
The different components of the action sequence children demonstrated when 
recreating the action sequence for a puppet approximating a peer further supports the two 
cognitive profiles proposed of the ritual and instrumental stances. Children in the ritual 
stance appear to be creating a prototype of the novel behavior, encoding the components 
of the sequence with attention to all components, even those that could be deemed 
causally irrelevant. Thus, children in this condition were more likely to demonstrate 
behaviors such as bead to forehead touches and stretching the string rather than just 
making a necklace.  
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In contrast, children in the ritual stance appear to focus on efficient end-goal 
execution through the creation an evaluative catalogue of behaviors rather than a 
behavioral prototype. Rather than recreating the causally irrelevant components of bead 
to forehead touching or string stretching, children in the instrumental condition were 
more likely to simply make a necklace. Moreover, children’s reconstruction of the 
necklace for the puppet was their second interaction with the necklace-making materials. 
Ostensibly in their first interaction with the necklace-making materials (in the imitation 
task), the children in the instrumental condition would have had an opportunity to assess 
what was and was not causally efficacious in the creation of the necklace. Therefore, in 
their second interaction, demonstrating the behavior for the puppet, they were better 
poised to engage in only the behaviors necessary to make a necklace (stringing the 
beads).  
Given that children were only assessed on two dimensions of memory and attention, 
however, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate definitively that interpretation 
rather than memory is driving the behavioral differences between the stances. In the 
immediate recall condition, children were not asked to about the novel gestures or various 
action components of the sequence. While it might be difficult to assess this knowledge 
via a direct recall measure, future studies could examine potential differences in memory 
by explicitly asking children to exactly reproduce what the model had done. Moreover, 
future research is needed to assess children’s recall of the novel behavior over time to 
examine how the stances might affect long-term memory encoding of the action 
sequence. In addition, eye-tracking studies might provide a more nuanced picture of what 
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children are attending to during the demonstration of a novel behavior and if children in 
different conditions display different attention patterns.  
Furthermore, whereas a puppet is a controlled and efficient approximate peer from an 
experimental perspective, there is much to be gained from examining imitation as it 
occurs in peer group settings. More research is needed to explore how children use 
imitation as a tool for learning from each other and how observing a novel behavior in the 
presence of peers might impact children’s imitative behaviors. Some such research could 
be a variation on the transmission chain research used previously with preschoolers and 
chimpanzees (Flynn, 2012; Horner, Whiten, Flynn, & DeWaal, 2006) to see if different 
types of social and contextual cuing could be used to encourage the maintenance of 
causally irrelevant components over the course of a new behavior’s transmission. 
 Functional fixedness. Findings from the present study support functional 
fixedness as a potential cognitive factor underlying children’s high levels of imitative 
fidelity in the ritual stance, at least for 5 and 6 year-old children. As anticipated, older 
children in the ritual stance showed higher levels of functional fixedness as manifested by 
marginally lower rates of solving the problem presented in the ritual preutilization 
condition than in the instrumental preutilization condition. While some children in both 
preutilization conditions demonstrated difficulty with solving the problem, as anticipated, 
a greater proportion of children in the instrumental preutilization condition were able to 
solve the problem. This difference indicates the possibility that children in the ritual 
condition had formed a less flexible representation of the necklace making materials 
when their previous function – the end result of a novel action sequence – was activated. 
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Children in both the ritual non-preutilization and instrumental non-preutilization 
conditions more or less consistently solved the problem with little difficulty, as would be 
predicted from the perspective of functional fixedness – as functional fixedness tends to 
only be enacted when the known function of an object is being activated. Moreover, five 
year-olds demonstrated behavioral patterns very similar to six year-olds indicating that 
functional fixedness may have been activated in children younger than six, an age group 
thought to be immune to functional fixedness (German & Defeyter, 2000).  
 These findings suggest that when the ritual stance is activated, children may form 
a more strict representation of the use of any objects acted upon in the action sequence 
while children for whom the instrumental stance is activated may not show the same 
cognitive inflexibility. This potential state of cognitive flexibility or cognitive 
inflexibility suggests that children may be imitating with greater fidelity in the ritual 
condition due to a fixed representation of the objects and a resultant desire to only use the 
objects in the way they had been presented. Alternatively, children in the instrumental 
stance are not limited by the same inflexibility and may feel more comfortable exploring 
the multiple functions of the objects in order to assess the most causally efficacious way 
of executing the given end goal.  
 Given that four year-old children did not demonstrate similar patterns of 
functional fixedness (possibly due to the overall difficulty of the task) and the 
inaccessibility of the task to three year-olds, it is difficult to extend this generalization 
beyond the older children. Three and four year-olds, however, are susceptible to the same 
social and contextual cues as five and six year-olds in regards to the activation of the 
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ritual and instrumental stances and therefore it follows that they too might demonstrate 
functional fixedness if presented with a task that is better suited for their problem-solving 
abilities.5 Future research is needed to examine if functional fixedness is a potential 
underlying cognitive component of the ritual stance across ages or if it develops through 
ontogeny.  
Imitation and cultural learning 
 Young children are proficient causal learners (Gopnik, et al., 2004, Gopnik, 
Sobel, Schulz, & Glymour, 2001) so their documented tendency to engage in high fidelity 
imitation in causal-learning situations can and should be attributed to social and 
contextual factors rather than an overzealous penchant for inefficient mimicry. The 
findings from the present study suggest that children are relying on social and contextual 
cues when determining whether to imitate with high fidelity or to eliminate unnecessary 
elements from an action sequence.  
 Children have access to an assortment of opportunities to learn through imitation 
in their daily lives. Although imitation efficiently facilitates the faithful transmission of 
information and skills, the findings of this study suggest that children are selective about 
when they employ imitation, specifically high fidelity imitation, as a tool for social 
learning. Rather than engaging in indiscriminate imitation, children use social and 
contextual cues to determine when they need to attend to process rather than product in 
order to become competent cultural members. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 It should be noted that in German & Defeyter’s (2000) study, their youngest age group 
was five year-olds, thus the functional task on which this measure was based had not 
been previously executed with children younger than five years-old.  
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Appendix: 
Figure 1. Warm-up game pictures 
1a: Target pictures 
 
1b: First set of pictures 
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Figure 1. Warm-up game pictures (cont.) 
1c: Second set of pictures 
 
 1d: Third set of pictures 
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Figure 2. Necklace construction sequence 
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Figure 3. Full stimuli set for imitation task 
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Figure 4. Full stimuli set for immediate recall task 
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Figure 5. Functional fixedness room (“Bobo’s room”) 
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Figure 6. Object sets for functional fixedness 
 6a. Preutilization (beads on string) 
 
 6b. Non-preutilization (beads next to string)  
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Figure 7. Functional fixedness task solution 
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Figure 8. Imitative fidelity score for imitation task by condition collapsed across age 
groups 
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Figure 9. Innovation score by condition collapsed across age groups 
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Figure 10. Immediate recall scores by condition and age group 
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Figure 11. Imitative fidelity scores for teaching task by condition and age group 
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Figure 12. Proportion of children solving functional fixedness task by age group and 
condition 
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Figure 13. Mean solution time for 5 and 6 year-olds in the functional fixedness task by 
condition 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   61 
References 
Bjorklund, D., Hubertz, M., & Reubens, A. (2004). Young children’s arithmetic  
strategies in social context: How parents contribute to children’s strategy  
development while playing games. International Journal of Behavioral  
Development, 28(4), 347-357. 
Bock, J. (2010). An evolutionary perspective on learning. In D. Lancy, J. Bock, & S.  
Gaskins (Eds.), The Anthropology of Learning in Childhood (pp. 11-34). Lanham:  
Altamira Press. 
Bock, J. (2002). Learning, life history, and productivity. Human Nature, 13(2), 161-197. 
Bock, J. (2002). Evolutionary demography and intrahousehold time allocation: School  
attendance and child labor among the Okavango Delta Peoples of  
Botswana. American journal of human biology, 14(2), 206-221. 
Bolin, I. (2006). Growing up in a culture of respect: child rearing in highland Peru.  
Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (2005). The origin and evolution of cultures. New York:  
Oxford University Press. 
Call, J., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Copying results and copying actions in  
the process of social learning: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children  
(Homo sapiens). Animal cognition, 8(3), 151-163. 
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years  
later. Trends in cognitive sciences, 12(5), 187-192. 
 
	  	   62 
Callaghan, T., Moll, H., Rakoczy, H., Warneken, F., Liszkowski, U., Behne, T.,  
Tomasello, M. & Collins, W. A. (2011). Early social cognition in three cultural 
contexts. John Wiley and Sons. 
Carpenter, M., Akhtar, N., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Fourteen-through 18-month-old  
infants differentially imitate intentional and accidental actions. Infant Behavior 
and Development, 21(2), 315-330. 
Correa-Chávez, M., & Rogoff, B. (2009). Children’s attention to interactions directed to  
others: Guatemalan Mayan and European American patterns. Developmental  
Psychology, 45(3), 630-641.  
Crown, P.L. (2010). Learning in and from the past. In D. Lancy, J. Bock, & S. Gaskins  
(Eds.), The Anthropology of Learning in Childhood (pp. 397-418). Lanham: 
Altamira Press. 
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2006). Social learning and social cognition: The case for  
pedagogy. Processes of change in brain and cognitive development. Attention and  
performance XXI, 249-274. 
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2009). Natural pedagogy. Trends in cognitive sciences, 13(4),  
148-153. 
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2011). Natural pedagogy as evolutionary  
adaptation. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological  
Sciences, 366(1567), 1149-1157. 
Defeyter, M. A., & German, T. P. (2003). Acquiring an understanding of design:  
evidence from children's insight problem solving. Cognition, 89(2), 133-155. 
	  	   63 
Flynn, E. (2008). Investigating children as cultural magnets: do young children transmit  
redundant information along diffusion chains?. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 363(1509), 3541. 
Gaskins, S., & Paradise, R. (2010). Learning through observation in daily life. In D.  
Lancy, J. Bock, & S. Gaskins (Eds.), The Anthropology of Learning in Childhood  
(pp. 85-117). Lanham: Altamira Press. 
Gauvain, M. (2001). The social context of cognitive development. New York: Guilford  
Press. 
Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (2006). Sylvia’s recipe: The role of imitation and pedagogy in  
the transmission of cultural knowledge. Roots of human sociality: Culture,  
cognition, and human interaction, 229-255. 
German, T. P., & Barrett, H. C. (2005). Functional fixedness in a technologically sparse  
culture. Psychological Science, 16(1), 1-5. 
German, T. P., & Defeyter, M. A. (2000). Immunity to functional fixedness in young  
children. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 7(4), 707-712. 
Göncü, A., Jain, J., & Tuermer, U. (2007). Children's play as cultural interpretation. Play  
and development: Evolutionary, sociocultural, and functional perspectives, 155- 
178. 
Gopnik, A., Glymour, C., Sobel, D. M., Schulz, L. E., Kushnir, T., & Danks, D. (2004).  
A theory of causal learning in children: causal maps and Bayes  
nets. Psychological Review; Psychological Review, 111(1), 3. 
 
	  	   64 
Gopnik, A., Sobel, D. M., Schulz, L. E., & Glymour, C. (2001). Causal learning  
mechanisms in very young children: two-, three-, and four-year-olds infer causal 
relations from patterns of variation and covariation.Developmental 
psychology, 37(5), 620. 
Harris, P. (2012). Trusting What You’re Told: How Children Learn from Others.  
Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Herrmann, P.A., Legare, C.H., Harris, P.L., & Whitehouse, H. (2013). Stick to the script:  
The effect of witnessing multiple actors on children’s imitation. Cognition, 129, 
536-543. 
Heyes, C. (2001). Causes and consequences of imitation. Trends in cognitive 
sciences, 5(6), 253-261. 
Horner, V., Whiten, A., Flynn, E., & de Waal, F. B. (2006). Faithful replication of 
foraging techniques along cultural transmission chains by chimpanzees and  
children. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(37), 13878-
13883. 
Kenward, B. (2012). Over-imitating preschoolers believe unnecessary actions are  
normative and enforce their performance by a third party. Journal of experimental  
child psychology. 
Kenward, B., Karlsson, M., & Persson, J. (2011). Over-imitation is better explained by  
norm learning than by distorted causal learning. Proceedings of the Royal Society 
B: Biological Sciences, 278(1709), 1239-1246. 
 
	  	   65 
Lancy, D. F., Bock, J. C., & Gaskins, S. (2009). The anthropology of learning in  
childhood. Lanham: AltaMira Press. 
Lancy, D. (2008). The anthropology of childhood: cherubs, chattel, changelings.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for  
categorical data. Biometrics, 159-174. 
Legare, C.H., Whitehouse, H. Herrmann, P. & Wen, N.J. (under review). The Imitative  
Foundations of Cultural Learning.  
López, A., Correa-Chávez, M., Rogoff, B., & Gutiérrez, K.  (2010). Attention to  
instruction directed to another by US Mexican-heritage children of varying  
cultural backgrounds.  Developmental Psychology, 46(3), 593-601. 
Lyons, D. E., Damrosch, D. H., Lin, J. K., Macris, D. M., & Keil, F. C. (2011). The scope  
and limits of overimitation in the transmission of artefact culture. Philosophical  
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 366(1567), 1158-1167. 
Lyons, D. E., Young, A. G., & Keil, F. C. (2007). The hidden structure of  
overimitation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(50), 19751- 
19756. 
Nagell, K., Olguin, R. S., & Tomasello, M. (1993). Processes of social learning in the  
tool use of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo  
sapiens). Journal of Comparative Psychology; Journal of Comparative  
Psychology, 107(2), 174. 
 
	  	   66 
Nielsen, M., & Tomaselli, K. (2010). Overimitation in Kalahari Bushman children and  
the origins of human cultural cognition. Psychological Science,21(5), 729-736. 
Over, H., & Carpenter, M. (2009). Priming third-party ostracism increases affiliative  
imitation in children. Developmental science, 12(3), F1-F8. 
Over, H., & Carpenter, M. (2012). Putting the social into social learning: Explaining both  
selectivity and fidelity in children's copying behavior. Journal of Comparative  
Psychology, 126(2), 182 
Rakoczy, H., Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2008). The sources of normativity: Young  
children’s awareness of the normative structure of games. Developmental  
Psychology, 44(3), 875–881. 
Rogoff, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in social context.  
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Rogoff, B. (1998). Cognition as a collaborative process. In D. Kuhn & R.S. Siegler (Vol.  
Eds.), W. Damon (Gen. Ed), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 2, Cognition,  
language, and perceptual development (5th ed., pp. 679–744). New York: Wiley. 
Rogoff, B. (2003). The Cultural Nature of Human Development. New York: Oxford  
University Press.  
Silva, K. G., Correa-Chávez, M., & Rogoff, B.  (2010).  Mexican-heritage children's  
attention and learning from interactions directed to others.  Child  
Development, 81(3), 898-912. 
 
 
	  	   67 
Southgate, V., Chevallier, C., & Csibra, G. (2009). Sensitivity to communicative  
relevance tells young children what to imitate. Developmental science, 12(6),  
1013-1019. 
Tennie, C., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Ratcheting up the ratchet: on the evolution  
of cumulative culture. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B:  
Biological Sciences, 364(1528), 2405-2415. 
Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge: Harvard  
University Press. 
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding and  
sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition.Behavioral and brain  
sciences, 28(5), 675-690. 
Tomasello, M., Savage-Rumbaugh, S., & Kruger, A. C. (1993). Imitative learning of  
actions on objects by children, chimpanzees, and enculturated chimpanzees. Child  
development, 64(6), 1688-1705. 
Tudge, J., Putnam, S., & Valsiner, J. (1996). Culture and cognition in developmental  
perspective. In R.B. Cairns, G.H. Elder, Jr, & E.J. Costello (Eds.), Developmental  
science (pp. 190–222). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Valsiner, J., & Van der Veer, R. (1988). On the social nature of human cognition: An  
analysis of the shared intellectual roots of George Herbert Mead and Lev  
Vygotsky. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 18, 117–135. 
Watson-Jones, R., Legare, C.H., Whitehouse, H., & Clegg, J.M. (under review).  
Affiliative motivations and the development of imitation.  
	  	   68 
Wertsch, J.V., & Tulviste, P. (1992). L.S. Vygotsky and contemporary developmental  
psychology. Developmental Psychology, 28, 548–557. 
Whiten, A., Custance, D. M., Gomez, J. C., Teixidor, P., & Bard, K. A. (1996). Imitative  
learning of artificial fruit processing in children (Homo sapiens) and chimpanzees  
(Pan troglodytes). Journal of comparative psychology, 110(1), 3. 
Whiten, A., McGuigan, N., Marshall-Pescini, S., & Hopper, L. M. (2009). Emulation,  
imitation, over-imitation and the scope of culture for child and  
chimpanzee. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological  
Sciences, 364(1528), 2417-2428. 
Williamson, R. & Markman, E. (2006). Precision of Imitation as a Function of  
Preschoolers’ Understanding of the Goal of the Demonstration. Developmental  
Psychology, 42(4), 723–731. 
Williamson, R. A., & Meltzoff, A. N. (2011). Own and others’ prior experiences  
influence children's imitation of causal acts. Cognitive development, 26(3), 260- 
268. 
Williamson, R. A., Meltzoff, A. N., & Markman, E. M. (2008). Prior experiences and  
perceived efficacy influence 3-year-olds' imitation. Developmental  
psychology, 44(1), 275-285. 	  
